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In those texts from the New Kingdom which we usually associate 
with the phenomenon called "Personal Piety", we meet with a rather 
emphatic rhetoric of polarity and decision. The most characteristic 
element of this rhetoric is a form which we may call "makarismos" 
(beatitude) following the terminology of Biblical and Classical schol­
ars. It consists of opposing two antithetic attitudes towards god and 
giving praise to the one and woe to the other. Let me quote just 
one typical example: 
I will give praise to your beautiful face, 
and propitiate your Ka daily, 
for I have placed myself upon your water 
and have filled my heart with you. 
You are a god to whom one can appeal, 
gende of heart towards mankind. 
Happy the man who puts you into his heart, 
woe to him who attacks you! 
Because of your wrath being so great, 
because of your plans being so efficient, 
because of your mercy being so fast.1 
There are several dozen examples which I have collected in an ear­
lier article.2 We may safely assume that the form of makarismos is 
very typical of the general trend or movement of Personal Piety. Not 
all of the examples are antithetic like the one just quoted. Many 
consist only in a praise of the pious one without mentioning the 
opposite case. However, the general presupposition seems to be that 
there are two possible forms of a relationship between god and man, 
' C u b e s ta tue of R a m o s e , see F . R . H e r b i n , Histoire du Fayum de la xviii.e a la xxx.e 
dynastie (these du IH.e cycle, S o r b o n n e Paris 1980), 187 doc. 189. I o w e this to 
Pascal V e r n u s . 
2 "Weishe i t , Loyal i smus u n d F r o m m i g k e i t " , in: E. H o r n u n g , O . K e e l (Hrsg.), Stu-
dien zu altazyptischen Ijebmslehren (Orb is Biblicus et O r i e n t . 28), F r i b o u r g u n d G o t t i n g e n 
1979, 11­72 . 
Originalveröffentlichung  in: Jan Assmann, Guy G. Stroumsa (Hg.), Transformations of the inner self 
in ancient religions (Studies in the history of religions 83), Leiden ; Boston ; Köln 1999, S. 31-44
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piety and impiety, and that a human being is in the situation of 
deciding which way to go, which attitude towards god to adopt, 
which relationship to form. Therefore, piety seems to have been con­
ceived of as a form of relationship between man and god based on 
a conscious decision. Piety is not something natural, innate and 
inevitable such as Schleiermacher's "Kreaturgefuhl" (the innate feel­
ing of being a creature of god), but a relation which has to be con­
sciously and conscientiously chosen and formed. 
Other texts are a little more explicit concerning the antagonistic 
attitudes of piety and impiety. Two famous texts oppose the "silent 
one" and the "heated one". It seems evident that this opposition 
refers to the same pair as the inscription just quoted which opposed 
the pious one "who placed god into his heart" and the impious one 
"who attacks god". 
O Thot, you well that is sweet 
to a man who thirsts in the desert! 
It is sealed to him who finds words. 
It is open to the silent. 
Comes the silent, he finds the well. 
To the heated man you are hidden.3 
As for the heated man in the temple, 
he is like a tree growing indoors. 
A moment lasts its growth of shoots, 
Its end comes about in the woodshed. 
It is floated far from its place, 
the flame is its burial shroud. 
The truly silent, who keeps apart, 
He is like a tree grown in a meadow. 
It greens, it doubles its yield, 
it stands in front of its lord. 
Its fruit is sweet, its shade delightful, 
Its end comes in the garden.4 
3 G a r d i n e r , L E M , 85f.; C a m i n o s , L E M , 321; Lich the im , A E L II , 114. 
4 A m e n e m o p e V I . Iff. c h a p t e r IV; Lich the im , A E L II, 150T. I. S h i r u n ­ G r u m a c h , 
" D i e L e h r e des A m e n e m o p e " , in: O . Kai se r (Hrsg.), TUAT III.2, Weisheitstexk II, 
Giitersloh 1991, 230. G r u m a c h ; R. Anthes , in: A. K u s c h k e / E . Kutsch (Hg.), Auhimkgie 
und Altes Testament (Fs. K u r t Galling), T u b i n g e n 1970, 9 ­ 1 8 ; G . Posene r , Z A S 99, 
1973, 129­ 135; Sh. Israeli , " C h a p t e r F o u r of the W i s d o m Book of A m e n e m o p e " , 
in: Studies in Egyptology (Fs. M . Lichthe im) , J e r u s a l e m 1990, I, 4 6 4 ­ 4 8 4 . 
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Putting god into one's heart means trust in god and abstinence from 
heated action. The pious one gives up the heat of will and passion 
and adopts a quietistic attitude. It is interesting to consider this phe­
nomenon in the context of conversion. Of course, we are not deal­
ing here with "conversion" in the full sense of the term, such as it 
has been defined and phenomenologically demonstrated by Arthur 
Darby Nock more than 60 years ago. Conversion in the proper sense 
is inseparably linked to a notion of absolute and metaphysical truth 
that is alien to ancient Egypt. We have to wait for another thou­
sand years until this idea of superior truth becomes socially influential, 
that is, until communities emerge that gather around such a truth. 
Conversion in the full sense of the term means to enter such a com­
munity after having recognized the superiority of its truth. 
There are no communities of this kind in ancient Egypt, no doc­
trine or conceptual framework to adopt by "converting" to such a 
community and its superior truth. The only element which seems 
comparable to the phenomenology of conversion is the element of 
decision. Whether this decision for god implies certain theological or 
metaphysical doctrines and certain ethical principles we cannot know. 
However, there are certain texts that shed at least some light on the 
question as to what it could have meant to have made the decision 
or, to use the Egyptian term, to put god in one's heart and to act 
on the water of god. 
I propose to first have a look at these texts, then to ask for the 
history of this concept and the conditions of its origin and develop­
ment and lastly to (at least tentatively) draw some conclusions con­
cerning our general question of the concept of person and its 
transformations in the ancient world. 
I 
An ostracon from the time of Ramses II. has preserved a literary 
text which reads like the confession of somebody who has made the 
decision for god: 
I have put yesterday and today in the hands of Amun 
and was found safe and my plans firmly established. 
I made for myself a beautiful remaining until my time is fulfilled, 
rendering myself over to him completely; he is my mooring post. 
JAN ASSMANN 
0 what happiness is a burial, there is nothing like it. 
A protector among men vanishes, his plans fail. 
1 gave myself to Amun and I found what is good.5 
T h e content of this strange confession becomes m u c h clearer when 
compared to an inscription in the t o m b of a certain Zimut-Kiki at 
Thebes f rom the same time.1' In this inscription, Kiki renders account 
of his decision for the goddess M u t and its economical implications. 
There was a man of Southern On, 
a true scribe in Thebes; 
Zimut was the name his mother gave him, 
called Kiki, justified. 
Him his god had instructed 
and made knowledgeable in his teaching; 
he put him on the way of life 
in order to preserve his limbs; 
god had recognized him already as a child 
and had assigned him food and riches. 
Then he reflected upon himself 
to find for himself a protector. 
And he found Mut on top of the deities, 
fate and fulfilment in her grasp, 
life-time and breath at her disposal. 
All that happens occurs upon her order. 
He said: I will give her all my fortune and my income, 
for I recognize her power with my eyes, 
her unique efficiency. 
She made my fear vanish 
and gave me shelter in the moment of distress. 
She came, the north-wind ahead of her, 
when I called her by her name. 
I am a weak one of her town, 
a poor one and a pilgrim of her city. 
I disposed of my possession in her favor, 
in exchange for the breath of life. 
No one of my household shall have a share in this, 
but to her Ka shall belong everything in peace. 
( . . . ) 
5 Colin Campbell 4 (Glasgow D. 1925.69), ed. J . Cerny and A.H. Gardiner, 
Hieratic Ostraca, Oxford 1957, pi. 39.1; AHG Nr. 186; T U A T 23. 
6 Abd el Qader-Mohammad, in: ASAE 59, 1960, pi. 48ff.;J.A. Wilson, in: JJVES 
29, 187-92; AHG Nr. 173. Pascal Vermis, "Litterature et autobiographic Les in­
scriptions de S3­Mwt surnomme Kyky", in: RdE 30, 1978, 115­146. 
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I did not choose for myself a protector among humans, 
I did not attach myself to the mighty one. 
There is no son of me that I found out 
in order to arrange my burial. 
The burial is in your hand alone, 
you are the goddess of birth who will provide for me 
with a perfect mummy when the time of dying will have come. 
I have assigned to you all my possessions, 
you have entered into all my property. 
Therefore you may now provide for my protection from all evil 
until my end has come! 
Let my eyes see the rays of the female sun, 
let my ears hear without deafness, 
my nose breathe the air, 
the way (sic) of life enter my body without interruption, 
let my neck and my throat breathe, 
let my mouth be efficient and my lips sharp, 
let my tongue distinguish the taste, 
all my members being complete and alive. 
There is no claim on my body, no tongue has power over me, 
no human being shall hurt me. 
The text continues in the same vein for about another 50 verses but 
I will stop here because the argument has by now become clear. 
We are dealing not only with an act of conversion but also with an 
economical transaction. Kiki has transferred his property to the tem­
ple of Mut in exchange for a kind of insurance both for his life­
time and for his burial and mortuary cult. Another inscription in 
his tomb gives a copy of the official document of transaction. He 
calls this "making Mut his protector" or "patron" and explicitly states 
to have preferred Mut to a human patron and to a member of his 
own family. We are now in a position to better understand the first 
text which also speaks of rendering oneself over to Amun, mentions 
in this context the burial and calls Amun a mooring­post. The author 
of this text or rather the "I" in whose mouth the speech is put has 
made the same decision as Kiki did. He chose Amun as a protec­
tor to provide for his life and burial. 
It seems quite evident that Kiki had deliberately chosen Mut in 
a situation of choice and decision. He explains his decision for Mut 
by hinting to an experience of salvation in times of anxiety. In 
another stanza he says: 
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My heart is filled with my mistress. 
I have no fear of anyone. 
I spend the night in quiet sleep, 
because I have a protector. 
Already some 150 years earlier we read on an ostracon: 
I gave you into my heart because of your strength. [. . .] 
You are my protector. Behold: my fear has vanished.7 
These sentences were scribbled on a chip of limestone and placed 
before the god on the occasion of a festive procession. They seem 
to attest an experience similar to that of Kiki and perhaps even a 
similar decision which must not necessarily have implied similar eco­
nomical transactions. So much is clear that in all these cases the 
decision refers to the choice of a protector or patron. Another exam­
ple comes from a literary text of the Ramesside period: 
Pilot who knows the water, 
Amun, steering­oar that does not lead astray! 
Who gives bread to him who has none, 
who keeps alive the servant of his house. 
I did not choose for myself a magistrate as protector, 
I did not attach myself to a rich one, 
I do not give my share to a man who was in the house of [the king]. 
My lord is my protector! 
I know his strength. 
He is a protector with powerful arm, 
he alone is strong.8 
II 
Decision is a reaction. It is a step that one is forced to take when 
confronted with an alternative, a binary situation. In our case, this 
binary situation appears in a personalized form. You are summoned 
to make a decision for or against god. You are confronted with a 
will and a claim and you are free to follow or to resist this will. It 
is this will or claim that structures reality in a binary way. "Who is 
not for me is against me." The strongest analogies to this situation 
7 C a i r o C G 12217 r ec to ed. G . Posene r , in: " L a pie te persone l le avan t l ' age 
a m a r n i e n " , Revue d'Egfptolosie 27, 1975, 206f. 
8 Anastas i II , 9 . 2 ­ 1 0 . 1 ; G a r d i n e r , 17f.; C a m i n o s , 58f.; A H G 177. 
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are to found in the realm of politics. Carl Schmitt who was a fas­
cist and an anti­semite and thus not an authority to be quoted with 
ease nevertheless had a point in holding that the realm of the polit­
ical is structured by and based upon the distinction between friend 
and foe and that it is this decision which has to be recognized as 
the fundamentally political one. According to Schmitt, the political 
space is constructed by making the distinction between pro and con, 
friend and enemy. The rhetoric of decision is based on a politics of 
polarization. The claim of god to form a decision is a political claim. 
In claiming or at least implying the principle "Who is not for me 
is against me", God is acting as a politician, as a sovereign lord. 
With the category of decision, we are entering the realm of politi­
cal theology. 
This interpretation is overwhelmingly confirmed by texts dealing 
with the king instead of god. These texts, which belong to the Middle 
Kingdom and are thus much older than the New Kingdom texts of 
Personal Piety, prove to be the proper place of a rhetoric of deci­
sion and are to be considered without any doubt as the model of 
the New Kingdom concept. 
In a text called the Loyalist Instruction we read (and I give only 
a small selection out of a wealth of similar antithetic formulations): 
H e w h o m h e f a v o u r s wil l b e a p o s s e s s o r o f n o u r i s h m e n t , 
b u t h e w h o d e f i e s h i m wil l h a v e n o t h i n g . 9 
H e w h o is l o y a l t o t h e k i n g wil l b e a p o s s e s s o r o f a t o m b , 
b u t n o t o m b f o r h i m w h o r e b e l s a g a i n s t H i s M a j e s t y . 1 " 
T h e k i n g is B a s t e t w h o g u a r d s t h e T w o l a n d s , 
h e w h o w o r s h i p s h i m is p r o t e c t e d b y h i s a r m . 
H e is S a k h m e t t o h i m w h o d e f i e s h i s c o m m a n d , 
h e w h o m h e h a t e s wil l b e c o m e h o m e l e s s . " 
These quotations come from a literary text and a work of propa­
ganda, addressed to the noble families in order to win them over 
for the cause of the ruling dynasty. This 12th dynasty was in a pecu­
liar situation. It was confronted with the task of liquidating the anar­
chy or rather "polyarchy" of the First Intermediate Period and of 
9 Loyalist Ins t ruc t ion ed . G . Posener , L'Enseigiiement loyaliste. Sagesse egyptierme du 
Moyen Empire, G e n f 1976, 22, 7 6 ­ 7 7 , § 3 . 9 ­ 1 0 , Papyrus fas sung . 
10 Posene r , a . a . O . , 2 9 ­ 3 0 , 9 2 ­ 9 3 , § 6 . 3 ­ 4 , Ste lenfassung . 
11 Posene r , a . a . O . , 2 6 29, 9 0 ­ 9 1 , § 5 . 1 1 ­ 1 4 . 
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re-erecting a strongly centralized pharaonic monarchy. Feudalist struc­
tures had to be replaced by bureaucratic ones. The aristocracy saw 
itself placed before the decision either to enter the bureaucracy, to 
adopt the new­old political system and an attitude of loyal adher­
ence to the dynasty, or to insist on its feudal power and to resist 
the claim for re­integration and subordination. The rulers of the 
12th dynasty were weak—or clever—enough not to use force but 
rhetoric in building their empire. In this context, the rhetoric of deci­
sion and its semantics of polarization had a very concrete reference 
to social groups and historical situations. 
However, the kings of the 12th dynasty were by no means the 
first ones to invent, use and develop this polarizing semantics. They 
inherited this tradition from the very system which they opposed. 
After the fall of the Old Kingdom, new social structures arose which 
can be characterized as "patron­client­relations". The break­down of 
the economic system of central redistribution necessitated the emer­
gence of private enterprise on a local scale. Local lords, "big men" 
arose who based their claim of leadership on a clientele of adher­
ents. This is the historical context in which the rhetoric of decision 
and its value­system of trust, loyalty, devotion, solidarity, obedience, 
protection etc. originated. For an example, let me quote some pas­
sages from the tomb inscriptions of a certain Ankhtifi of Mo'alla 
who appears as the most outspoken and the most characteristic figure 
among these big men of the FIP. 
As to everyone on whom I placed my hand, 
no misfortune ever befell him, 
Because my heart was sealed and my counsel excellent. 
But as to any fool and wretch 
who stands up in opposition, 
He receives according to what he gave. 
Woe! will be said of one who is accused by me. 
His board will take water like a boat. 
For I am a champion without peer!12 
The relation of a client to his patron is without any doubt a mat­
ter of decision. He is not born into this relation but enters it by 
(more or less) free choice among conflicting and rivalling claims for 
adherence. His motive for giving up independence and entering a 
12 N a c h W . Schenkel , Memphis, Herakleopolis, Theben—die epigraphischen ^eugnisse der 
7.-11. Dynastie Agyptens, A g A b h 12, W i e s b a d e n 1965, 46f. L ich the im , A E L I, 86. 
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relationship of dependence is need of security and provision. He who 
adheres and proves loyal to the right patron will be secure: "No 
misfortune will ever befall him" as the frequently attested formula 
has it.13 From the point of view of the patron, society is divided into 
loyals and rebels, followers and ignorants. Their claim for adher­
ents presents the world in a rather pessimistic light. For the ordinary 
people, future has only misfortune in store and it is only the patron 
who can provide an efficient protection against these misfortunes. 
This is the reason why both the inscriptions of the FIP and the 
didactic literature of the MK abound in descriptions of chaos. They 
need the concepts of danger, insecurity and chaos in order to cre­
ate the political realm, the space of decision and their system of loy­
alistic values. In another inscription of the tomb of Ankhtifi we read: 
As to him who listened to my counsel 
no misfortune ever befell him. 
Who listened to me praised god. 
But he who did not listen to me said "Woe!" 
For I am the protector of the fearful one, 
the fortified place of him who fled from afar. 
I am a champion without peer." 
The text could not be more explicit as to the polarization of real­
ity and society which forms the principle of loyalism. Fortune and 
misfortune of an individual depend on his decision for or against a 
patron, for or against obedience. He who has made the decision for 
the patron and proves trustworthy is on the safe side and no mis­
fortune will befall him. But woe to him who ignores his claim; he 
will have reason for regret and repentance. The principle of loyal­
ism polarizes society into friends and foes. This is so because of the 
non­natural character of the patron­client­relationship. The submis­
sion to a patron is not without alternatives. There are other patrons 
and there is the possibility to keep independence. Therefore there is 
room for choice and decision, for loyalty and apostasy. 
Where there is room for choice and decision, there are also favor­
able conditions for new and more individualized concepts of the per­
son to emerge. This is quite evident both on the level of the patrons 
and on the level of the clients. 
13 W. Schenkel, "Nie kam ein MiBgeschick iiber mich", in: ZAS 91, 1964, 137­38. 
14 Schenkel, a.a.O., 55. 
40 JAN ASSMANN 
As to the patrons, they present themselves in their tomb-inscrip­
tions as veritable Renaissance men. These inscriptions rejoice in the 
newly acquired possibilities of personal initiative. For almost a mil­
lennium, pharaoh had ruled the country as the sole source of plan­
ning, decision and action and the whole staff of officials and magistrates 
were reduced to mere tools and implements of the royal will. Now, 
after the collapse of this institution of centralized initiative, people 
discovered their individual possibilities of organizing local systems of 
political and economic administration. 
The pharaohs of the 12th dynasty adopted this ideology and 
rhetoric because they were still operating in a space where there 
were alternatives to the monocratic system. At the beginning of the 
2nd millennium B.G.E., the historical situation was still a situation of 
decision. Pharaoh had to present himself to his people as the most 
powerful patron of all, as "the good shepherd" to use the favorite 
metaphor of royal ideology. The role of the patron is unfolded in a 
great variety of metaphors. Beside the good shepherd we find images 
such as the pilot, the steering oar, the father of the orphan, the hus­
band of the widow, all of which will reappear, along with some new 
ones, in the discourse of personal piety. There is a very obvious line 
of tradition, leading from the patrons of the FIP to royal ideology 
and from there to the theology of Personal Piety. 
The clients are even more interesting in the context of our pre­
sent study. They discover and develop a system of inner virtues and 
values and a concept of inner self or personality which is the seat 
of these virtues. The patron­client­relationship requires the inner self 
and its virtues because of the artificial character of this relationship. 
In contrast to "natural" relations such as family­relations and even 
the traditional concept of subject­king­relationship (which was con­
sidered to be something naturally and alternativelessly given), the 
client enters the relationship with a patron deliberately. This leads 
to a new emphasis on the inner self as the agency of deliberation 
and decision. Moreover, the client­patron­relationship can be revoked 
whereas relations of kinship and pharaonic subordination count as 
irrevokable. This leads to the invention of loyalty or fidelity as polit­
ical virtues. Where there is no possibility of apostasy, there is no 
point in preaching loyalty. Loyalty is very much a matter of the 
inner self. It is not an outward relation but an inner attachment. 
The Egyptian word for what we have called inner self is "heart". 
In striking contrast to Old Kingdom phraseology where the heart 
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plays no role at all, the hear t becomes the central topic in the tomb-
inscriptions since the Early Middle Kingdom. 
I am truly an official of great heart, 
a sweet lovable plant. 
I was no drunkard, I was not forgetful; 
I was not sluggish at my task. 
It was my heart that furthered my rank, 
it was my character that kept me in front.15 
This new concept of the hear t belongs to the discourse of the clients 
and not to that of the patrons. Grea t stress is laid on integration, 
subordinat ion, "silence", self control, obedience and altruism (hon­
esty, charity, fairness). T h e main evils to be resisted are greed, ego­
tism, self­assertion, independence , violence, aggression, recklessness, 
passion, uncontrolled emotion, uninhibited self­indulgence. This seems 
clearly a reaction against the glaring individualism of the pat rons 
such as Ankhtifi, the type of shm-jb, the "powerful­of­heart" .1 6 
T o this discourse belongs the emergence of a new type of auto­
biography which M . Lichtheim aptly calls " the mora l profile". A 
typical example can be found in one of the stelae of a certain Antef 
(BM 572) of which I quote some verses: 
Uniquely skillful, excellent of counsel, 
who heeds the word of those who know their speech, 
who is sent because deemed worthy, 
who gives account to the judge, 
knowing the turn of the heart's concern. 
Praised by his chiefs, known in the lord's house, 
whose heart conducts his affairs, 
who bends his arm to his superiors, 
who is beloved by the king's courtiers. 
A famed name as a knower of things, 
who follows the path without swerving, 
who hears the word in the chapel of Geb, 
privy to the secrets in the judgment hall— 
the honoured chamberlain Antef son of Sent.17 
T h e most explicit elaborat ion, however, of this concept of the heart 
as inner self appears on the stela of ano ther Antef who lived some 
15 L i c h t h e i m A n c i e n t Egyp t i an Autob iog raph i e s , Chief ly of the M i d d l e K i n g d o m , 
F r e i b u r g 1988, 42 46. 
16 Cf . G . Fecht , Der Vorwurf an Got! in den Mahnworkn des Ipuiver, A H A W 1972, 136f. 
" Lich the im Autob iog raph i e s , 107. 
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four or five h u n d r e d years later under Thutmos is III and who fol­
lowed in his autobiography closely the model of the Middle Kingdom: 
It was my heart that induced me to do this, 
according to its instruction for me. 
It is an excellent witness for me: 
I did not violate its injunctions. 
Because I feared to transgress its orders 
I prospered exceedingly well. 
I did very well because of its instructions concerning my way of action. 
I was free of reproach because of its guidance. 
(. . .) It is a divine utterance in every body, 
blessed be he whom it has conducted on the right way of action.18 
T h e heart , in this concept, appears as a moral instance, giving orders 
and instructions which must not be "violated" and "transgressed". 
T h e voice of the hear t is not the voice of self­reliant individuality 
but of social and moral responsibility which already has come to be 
recognized as a divine voice. It comes close to our not ion of con­
science, Gewissen. T h e voice of the hear t is the interiorized voice 
of the communi ty . It functions as c o m m o n sense, in the latin sense 
of sensus communis. It is the organ by which the individual is open to 
the rules of togetherness and lets him/herse l f be bound and built 
into the structure of the communi ty . 
Ill 
Let us now re turn to the point f rom where we started, the movement 
of Personal Piety and the emphasis it laid on the hear t and its deci­
sion for God. It seems obvious that we are dealing here with the 
application of the patron­client­relationship to the god­man­relationship. 
In the Middle Kingdom, this model had been adopted by the state 
in order to re­define the pharao­subject­re la t ionship. In the N e w 
Kingdom, the same model enters the sphere of political theology and 
religious anthropology. 
This development has a very strong parallel in the Bible and its 
covenant theology. T h e covenant theology is noth ing other than the 
application of ano the r political model , the lord­vassal­relationship 
to the religious sphere. T h e relationship between J H W H and His 
18 L o u v r e C 26: K . Sethe , Urkunden des agyptischen Altertums IV , repr . G r a z 1961, 
974f . 
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people is modelled upon the relationship between an overlord such 
as the king of Assur and a vassal king. In Biblical religion, we are 
dealing with the relationship between god and a collective subject 
called Israel. In Egypt, we are dealing with the relation between a 
deity and an individual. In both cases, however, the political model 
is used to form a new religious relationship. 
The new Egyptian concept of God as formed within the context 
of Personal Piety inherits the traditional roles and images of the 
patron. Like the patrons of the FIP and the pharaohs of the MK, 
God is called pilot and steering oar, father of the fatherless, hus­
band of the widow, judge of the poor. The new ideal of the pious 
one, on the other hand, inherits the characteristics of the client, his 
virtues of humbleness, modesty, self­control and "silence" as well as 
his status as an orphan, a poor one, a pilgrim and a mendicant. All 
these are images describing the position of dependence into which 
the individual has placed himself. Also the situational context of the 
decision is similar. In the FIP we find strong descriptions of distress 
and disorder. In the New Kingdom we meet with problems of a 
more individual kind. People are turning to god in search of a shel­
ter from fear and anxiety, guidance in a pathless and unintelligible 
world, protection against persecution, human injustice, malign demons 
and deities, dangers of all sort including the fear of Pharaoh.19 Typical 
requests for salvation refer to the injustice of the judges and to 
calumny: "may you rescue me from the mouth of men".20 Now not 
only man's inner world of passions, fears, drives and emotions but 
also the outer world of society and nature are considered unsteady, 
irrational, subject to abrupt change: 
Do not say "Today is like tomorrow". 
How will this end? 
Comes tomorrow, today has vanished, 
the d e e p has become the water's edge. 
Crocodiles are bared, hippopotami stranded, 
the fish crowded together. 
Jackals are sated, birds are in feast, 
the fishnets h a v e b e e n d r a i n e d . ' ' 
19 LA "Furcht"; "Gelahrdungsbewuffrsein". 
20 tBM 5656 AHG Nr. 190, 38-40 see p. 612 for other references. Cf. Job 5.21. 
Also the teaching of Amenemope promises to "save him (the disciple) from the 
mouth of strangers" (1.11), Lichthcim AEL II, 148. 
21 Amenemope 6.18 7.4; Lichtheim AEL II, 151. 
I i JAN ASSMANN 
T h e w o r l d h a s b e c o m e u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , u n c a l c u l a b l e a n d u n s t a b l e . I t 
n o l o n g e r i n s p i r e s c o m f o r t a n d c o n f i d e n c e . T h e r e is n o t h i n g f i r m 
a n d s t a b l e w i t h i n a n d w i t h o u t b u t g o d , t h e sole r e s t i n g p o i n t i n a 
t u r n i n g w o r l d . I n o r d e r t o find s t e a d i n e s s , m a n h a s t o p u t g o d i n t o 
t h e h e a r t , as t h e p h r a s e goes , a n d t o s u r r e n d e r t o g o d ' s l e a d e r s h i p . 
T h i s i d e a finds its m o s t exp l i c i t a n d a s it w e r e " c l a s s i c a l " e x p r e s s i o n 
i n a f a m o u s p a s s a g e i n t h e t e a c h i n g o f A m e n e m o p e : 
K e e p firm (dns " m a k e heavy") your hear t , steady y o u r hear t . 
D o not steer with your tongue . 
If a m a n ' s tongue is the boa t ' s rudder , 
the Lord of All is yet its pilot.22 
T h i s is t h e p o i n t w h e r e p i e t y d i f f e r s f r o m l o y a l i s m . N o loyal i s t t e x t 
h a s e v e r g o n e so f a r as t o ask f o r p l a c i n g t h e p a t r o n o r t h e k i n g 
i n t o o n e ' s h e a r t . T h e d e c i s i o n f o r a k i n g o r p a t r o n s h o u l d b e a m a t ­
t e r o f t h e i n n e r self a n d n o t j u s t a k i n d o f l i p ­ se rv ice . N o w , w i t h 
t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m l o y a l i s m t o p i e t y , t h e i d e a of t h e h e a r t ­ d i r e c t e d 
m a n t u r n s i n t o t h a t of t h e g o d d i r e c t e d h e a r t . T h i s is w h a t c o n ­
v e r s i o n m e a n s i n t h e c o n t e x t o f P e r s o n a l Pie ty . 
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